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1Abstract
We present a general model of two players contest with two types of ef-
forts. Contrary to the classical models of contest, where each player chooses
a unique eﬀort, and where the outcome depends on the eﬀorts of all the
players, contestants are allowed to reduce the eﬀort of the opponent. De-
fence increases one’s chance of winning while attack annihilates the defence
of the opponent. This model has many applications like political campaign-
ing, wars, competition among lobbies, job promotion competitions, or sport
contests. We study the general model of contest with attacks and defence
and propose an application to negative political campaigns, where two can-
didates arbitrate between disparaging their opponent or enhancing their own
image. We propose suﬃcient conditions for the existence and uniqueness
of a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the contest game. In the application,
we contribute to the empirically debated question dealing with the eﬀect of
attack on voters turnout, and show that the conclusion depends on the dis-
tribution of voters sensitivity to defence and attack. Furthermore, contrary
to the literature, we show that an underdog candidate may be less aggressive
than his opponent.
Journal of Economics Literature Classiﬁcation Numbers: D74, D72, C72
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21 Introduction
There exist two ways of winning a competition, by increasing one’s chances
of winning or by decreasing one’s opponents chances of winning. We refer to
this as the diﬀerence between positive and negative competition. There exist
many real life situations in which individuals have a choice between positive
or negative competition. In political campaigns, candidates can promote
their image, their ideas and their program or denigrate their opponent ideas,
image or program. In lobbies competitions, one lobby can try to promote
his interest or to attack the interest of an other lobby. In job seeking com-
petitions, candidates can invest in productive activities or try to discourage
the ﬁrm to hire another candidate. In wars, armies can defend or attack
a territory. In industrial advertizing competitions, a ﬁrm can promote the
qualities of a product or can denigrate a competitor’s product. There is no
reason to think that positive and negative eﬀorts have identical eﬀects.
We propose a theoretical model of contest that allows to diﬀerentiate
between positive and negative activities. Contrary to classical models of
contest, where each player chooses a unique level of eﬀort, and where the
result depends on the eﬀorts of the players, we suppose, as in the literature on
sabotage in contests, that players are allowed to reduce the eﬀective eﬀort of
their adversaries. In this eﬀort, we do not focus attention on the dissipation of
the rent but on the choice between positive and negative eﬀorts. That is why
we suppose that contestants have ﬁxed budgets. In the ﬁrst part of the paper,
we study the general model of contest with attacks and defences and give
suﬃcient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric Nash
equilibrium. In a second part, we propose an application to negative political
campaigns inspired by Shachar and Nalebuﬀ (1999), where two candidates
choose between disparaging their opponent or enhancing their own image. In
this application, we contribute to the hotly debated question on the eﬀect of
attacks on voters turnout, and show that the conclusion depends on voters
sensitivity to defences and attacks. Furthermore, we show that an underdog
candidate may attack less than his adversary.
3The huge literature on contest has been mainly focused on one-dimensional
eﬀorts. In these models, each competitor chooses an eﬀort level that increases
his probability of winning a prize. Following the seminal work by Tullock
(1967), this literature has considered a large number of variations on the
contest model. There exist a small number of papers studying positive and
negative eﬀorts in contests, in which negative eﬀort is called ”sabotage”.
The ﬁrst paper that has addressed this topic is the one by Lazear (1989).
Chen (2003) considers a model of job promotion tournament with n play-
ers, where the eﬀective eﬀorts (resulting from classical rent-seeking eﬀorts
and sabotage) is additively separable in positive and negative eﬀorts. The
main result of this paper is that the contestant which is the more productive
in positive lobbying is the most attacked in any equilibrium. In a diﬀerent
setting, Kr¨ akel (2004) proposes a two stage model with either help or sab-
otage. In the ﬁrst stage, contestants choose to help, to sabotage or to do
nothing, and in the second stage, players choose their rent-seeking eﬀort.
The main result of this paper is that there can exist asymmetric equilibria in
which one contestant helps his adversary and the second uses sabotage. The
closest paper to ours (ﬁrst part) is certainly the one by Konrad (2000) who
proposes a model of contest with sabotage with n players and linear costs.
The main result of this paper is that in a symmetric equilibrium, sabotage
can be eliminated when the number of contestants is large and sabotage can
lower or increase the rent dissipation. In the present paper, we consider the
case of two contestants with ﬁxed budgets. We give suﬃcient conditions for
the existence and the uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium.
The main contribution of the paper is the application to negative cam-
paigning. We try to clarify the empirical debate started by the work by
Ansolabehere, Iyengar, Simon and Valentino (1994) (AISV in the following).
Their experiment reveals that negative advertisements lower voters turnout.
They conﬁrm the experimental result for the case of 1992 U.S. Senate elec-
tion. They propose an explanation of the candidates rationality in going
negative: a candidate who criticizes her opponent will reinforce his partisans’
4support and will give to her opponent supporters reasons not to vote for their
favored candidate. This result has been challenged by Wattenberg and Brians
(1999) in an empirical analysis based on NES data from 1992 and 1996 U.S.
elections. On the contrary, they conclude that negative campaigning raises
voters participation. This result would come from the fact that negative
advertising may have a positive informative eﬀect on voters; Ansolabehere,
Iyengar and Simon (1999) respond to this ”criticism” in reanalyzing NES
data from 1992 and conﬁrm their ﬁrst conclusion. As for Finkel and Geer
(1998), using NES survey data set of presidential campaign advertisement
from 1960 to 1992, they ﬁnd that attack has no negative eﬀect on voters
turnout. Delving deeper into details, Kahn and Kenney (1999) , distinguish
two kinds of negative campaign advertising: useful negative advertising and
mudslinging. They use 1990 U.S. Senate election data and ﬁnd that relevant
negative advertising was an incentive to vote whereas mudslinging disgusted
voters and pushed them to choose not to go to the election booth. There has
been so far no theoretical model to study the eﬀect of negative campaigning
on voters’ turnout.
An other question addressed in the application is whether or not an un-
derdog candidate is more or less aggressive than his opponent. Skaperdas
and Grofman (1995) have studied a model of negative campaigning in which
defence eﬀorts make voters change their votes and attack eﬀorts lead initial
candidates supporters to abstain. They deﬁne the underdog candidate as
the one with the smallest initial support. The model is speciﬁed such that,
with the same negative advertising eﬀort, the number of voters that will ab-
stain is proportional to the initial support. Skaperdas and Grofman [15],
as Harrington and Hess (1996), show that the underdog is more aggressive.
In our model, an underdog candidate is the one with the smallest ﬁnancial
support. We show that the underdog candidate may be less aggressive than
his adversary (in absolute as well as in relative terms).
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the general
model of attack-defence contest, in section 3 we analyze the equilibrium
5properties, in section 4 we examine the application to negative political cam-
paigns, in section 5, we discuss the case of heterogeneous candidates and the
case of proportional election with N candidates, and we conclude in section
6.
2 The Model
Two players, L and R compete in a contest and choose two types of actions,
a defence level d and an attack level a. The probability of victory is given by
the comparison of the eﬀective eﬀorts resulting of attacks and defences. Let ψ
be the synergy function of the contest. Each player is associated with a value
of the synergy function that represents his eﬀective eﬀort in the competition.
Let ψR be the eﬀective eﬀort of player R and ψL the eﬀective eﬀort of player
L. Formally, as in classical models of contest, the probability of victory πR





We suppose that the eﬀective eﬀort of player R depends on his defence and
the attack of the adversary. The function ψ (twice continuously diﬀerentiable
on  + ×  + and three times diﬀerentiable) increases with the defence of the
player and decreases with the attack of his adversary. Formally,
ψ













(dR,a L) < 0
The two types of eﬀort can have diﬀerent interpretation in real world, de-
pending on the context. In electoral campaigns, d is a positive campaigning
6eﬀort and a is a negative advertisement eﬀort. In a war, d can be inter-
preted as the spending for weapons and a as the spending for anti-weapons
forces. In a job promotion competition, d is the productive activity and a is
a sabotage eﬀort (see Chen (2003)).
We suppose that defence and attack have decreasing marginal eﬀects on
ϕ =l n ψ. Furthermore, we consider that ψ is (strictly) log-concave in d
and (strictly) log-convex in a. Here, the log-convexity in a is not a strong
assumption, this is simply the symmetric hypothesis with the log-concavity















(dR,a L) > 0.
This assumption signiﬁes that the marginal eﬀect of attack on the adversary’s
eﬀective eﬀort is decreasing. In other words, the more a player attacks his








Figure 1: Synergy function and eﬀorts
7We suppose that, players have an incentive to defend and attack, that is
lim
d→0
ϕ1 (d,a)=+ ∞ and lim
a→0
ϕ2 (d,a)=−∞. As in classical contest models,
we suppose that players incur a cost of eﬀort. In the present model, the
cost depends on the attack and the defence levels. When player R chooses a
defence level dR a n da na t t a c kl e v e laR,h ep a y st h ec o s tC (dR + aR). This
functional form implicitly assumes that positive and negative campaigning
have similar costs. Indeed, the cost of an advertising campaign is indepen-
dent of its contents. We suppose that C is twice continuously diﬀerentiable,
strictly increasing (C  > 0) and convex (C   ≥ 0).
We are interested in the trade-oﬀ between attack and defence and we do
not study total spending choices. We suppose that players have (identical)
ﬁxed budgets.1 Let B be the budget of contestants R and L.P l a y e rR faces
the following budget constraint:
C (dR + aR) ≤ B.
Player R has to choose the levels of attack and defence which maximize his
probability of victory subject to his budget constraint. Hence, the optimiza-







ψ (dR,a L)+ψ(dL,a R)
 
,
s.t. : C (dR + aR) ≤ B
At this point, it is important to note that attacking and defending have
diﬀerent eﬀects on the probability that a player wins the tournament. Con-
sider an inﬁnitesimal increase of ψR and an inﬁnitesimal decrease of ψL.T h e
relative eﬀect on the probability that R wins the contest is:















Hence, the eﬀect of an increase in one candidate’s eﬀective eﬀort will be
greater than a decrease in the opponent’s one if the opponent has a higher
1We provide an example where this assumption is relaxed in the ﬁnal discussions.
8eﬀective eﬀort. This remark underlines an incentive, for a strong player to
attack a weakest one, and an incentive, for a weak player, to defend.
3 Equilibrium
In this section, we study the equilibrium properties (existence and unicity)
of the general model with two players presented above, when the budgets
are equal. We note fR the value of function f in (dR,a L), fL the value of
function f in (dL,a R), and fk the partial derivative of the function f with
respect to its kth argument.
Straightforwardly, with our assumptions, the budget constraints will be
satisﬁed with equality. Then, dR can be deﬁned as a function of aR, noted δ,
such that:
δ(aR)=C
−1 (B) − aR, (1)
Hence, we can focus on the choice of aR, with equation 1 determining the







This condition says that in an interior equilibrium, the rate of marginal
eﬀects of attack and promotion must be equal to the rate of the marginal
costs . This implicitly deﬁne the reaction correspondence of candidate R to
the attack of candidate L. L e tu sd e n o t eb yΓ( aL) candidate’s R best reply,
deﬁned by:
ϕ1 (δ(Γ(aL)),a L)=−ϕ2 (δ (aL),Γ(aL)), (3)
Proposition 1 There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium of the negative
campaigning game.
The strategic eﬀects are driven by the marginal cross-eﬀect of attack and
defence,
∂2ϕ
∂a∂d. This represents the eﬀect of simultaneous attack and defence
9on a player’s eﬀective eﬀort. Diﬀerentiating equation 3 leads to the following










The denominator is equal to the second order derivative of the payoﬀ and
is positive because ϕL
22 > 0a n dϕR
11 < 0 (for second order conditions, see
the proof of proposition 1). Finally, the sign of the slope of candidate’s R
best-reply function is given by:
Γ
 (aL) ∝ ϕ12 (δ(aL),Γ(aL)) − ϕ12 (δ (Γ(aL)),a L), (4)
Since the sign of the right-hand side may change, the attacks are not always
strategic substitutes or always strategic complements. Let εa be the elasticity
of eﬀective eﬀort with respect to attack and εd the elasticity of eﬀective eﬀort








Hence, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 2 (i) If
∂2εd
∂a2 , ∂2εa




∂d2 > 0 the equilibrium is unique.
The proof uses the result of proposition 1. Since there exists a unique





R. In both cases (i) and (ii), when the levels of attack are
diﬀerent, the attack of a player is a strategic complement of the opponent’s
one, and the attack of the opponent is a strategic substitute of the player’s
attack. Since the symmetric equilibrium is unique, the reaction functions can
not cross in any other point. The following graphs illustrate this remark:
I nt h ec a s ew h e r e
∂2εd
∂a2 ,∂2εa










































Figure 3: Reaction curves (case (ii))
Our assumptions are veriﬁed for a natural example, when candidate image
is the outcome of a contest between attack and defence:
Corollary 3 If ψ (d,a)=
dα
dα+aβ with α,β ∈]0,1[, then the equilibrium is
unique and symmetric.
11This example will illustrate the debate on the link between participation
and the tone of the campaign:
4 Application: does negative campaigning in-
crease or reduce turnout?
In this section, we analyze the important application to the political cam-
paigns. Political advertisements can be of diﬀerent natures, politicians can
choose to defend their ideas, their image, their morality... They can also
choose to attack their opponent’s program, image or morality... How do
these two kinds of advertisement inﬂuence voters’ choice? Will they be more
or less likely to vote? Will an underdog candidate be more or less aggressive?
In this section, we try to clarify these questions. The model is inspired on
Shachar and Nalebuﬀ (1999), who state that voters do not choose whether
or not to vote strategically. We consider that the population is split into two
types of agents. On the one hand, we consider the leaders (lobbies, medias,
candidates...), the agents who spend resources to support the campaign of one
candidate. These agents strategically (and cooperatively) choose whether to
invest or not for their preferred candidate. On the other hand, we consider
the followers, the voters, who choose whether or not to vote for a candidate
non strategically. We suppose that the followers are inﬂuenced by campaign
spending. Abstention is due to the existence of a positive cost of voting2.
Candidates’ payoﬀs depend on candidate images and on the cost of voting
which is the dominant factor for explaining voters turnout and abstention
(see Xu, 2002; B¨ orgers, 2001; Ledyard, 1981; and Palfrey and Rosenthal,
1983, 1985). To study the eﬀect of negative advertising, we introduce a cam-
paign game in which leaders have ﬁxed budgets and have to choose between
positive and negative advertising. In other words, leaders decide whether
they denigrate their opponent or promote their favorite candidate. The can-
2(for a model of abstention in a spatial competition setting, see Llavador, 2000)
12didate’s image is positively related to the candidate’s amount of positive
campaigning activities and negatively related to the other candidate’s neg-
ative campaigning activities. In the spirit of Shachar and Nalebuﬀ [14], we
suppose that a candidate image is not aﬀected by the candidate’s attack
and by the opponent’s positive campaigning. This assumption is justiﬁed by
the fact that these eﬀects are weaker than the ones we consider. Making a
voter change his vote is harder than making him not to vote for his favored
candidate. Indeed to make a citizen change his vote, he would have ﬁrst
to be convinced not to vote for his favored candidate, and, secondly, to be
convinced to vote for the adversary. We now explain how the attack-defence
contest can be applied to this campaigning game.
4.1 Negative Campaigning: a follow the leader ap-
proach
We introduce attack and defence in the model by Shachar and Nalebuﬀ
[14]. We suppose that two candidates, R and L compete in a winner-take-all
election. The population is divided into two types of agents. The leaders
engage resources in the campaign, and voters choose whether or not to vote
for their favored candidate.
The followers: the population of voters, with mass 1, is divided into two
types. Let r be the share of citizens preferring candidate R to candidate
L with the cumulative H and the density h with support [0,1] and h has
strictly positive values. H is an increasing and continuous function. When
this citizen chooses to vote for his preferred candidate, he gets a beneﬁt ψR
and he faces a cost of voting µ,w h e r eµ is an idiosyncratic component drawn




The leaders: in Shachar and Nalebuﬀ [14], ψR depends on ER, that is the
leaders spending in favor of candidate R. Since we want to study attack
13advertising, we will modify this assumption by assuming that the leaders’
spending in favor of candidate R is a vector with two components aR and dR,
where aR is the negative advertising eﬀort of leaders supporting R to attack
his opponent, and dR represents their promotion eﬀort in favor of candidate
R. The beneﬁt of voting for candidate R is an increasing function of his
promotion eﬀort and a decreasing function of his opponent attack eﬀort.
Formally:
ψ
R ≡ ψ (dR,a L),
The probability that R wins the election is equal to the probability that he
gets more votes than L, i.e. the probability that rψR ≥ (1 − r)ψL, or the
probability that r ≥
ψL














R +( 1− r)ψ
LdH (r),
Furthermore, we keep the same assumptions on function ψ as in section 2. We
now present our main example and draw conclusions on the (de)mobilizing
eﬀect of negative campaigning.
4.2 Main example
Suppose that a candidate’s image results from a contest between her promo-
tion and her adversary’s attack. If the electorate’s sensitivity to promotion









with α,β ∈]0,1[. Furthermore, suppose that the cost function is linear:
C (dR + aR)=dR + aR.
14Let BR and BL be the respective budgets of leader R and leader L. With



















such that the budget constraint is not violated.
This example would be complicated to solve directly because of the em-
bedded logit-form functions, but the general results of section 2 enable us to
compute it easily.
4.3 Negative campaigning: Increasing or decreasing
turnout?
In this section we analyze the main example when the budgets are identical,
BR = BL =1 .
Proposition 4 There exists a unique equilibrium, and the equilibrium levels


















Not surprisingly, the more voters are sensitive to attack, the higher the
level of equilibrium attacks, and the more voters are sensitive to promotion,
the higher the equilibrium promotion levels.




















15Now, we can analyze the sign of the correlation between attack and par-
ticipation. Suppose to simplify that β =1−α. Then β measures the voters’
relative sensitivity to attacks. Comparing the outcomes of an election in
diﬀerent States in U.S., or diﬀerent national elections, there is no reason to
think that β will be equal in each State or at each election. The empirical
result can be summarized with a graph. Each point of the graph represents
the participation rate and the corresponding attack equilibrium level in the
State. Here, we suppose that β varies across States or national elections, and
then look at the variations of participation and the variations of attack levels







and, the equilibrium attack level is also a function of β, denoted a(β)=β.
The following proposition states that the participation can be high in
one election when the campaign is negative and the participation can be low
when the campaign tone is positive.














Hence, when β is small enough or large enough, when the equilibrium
attack level increases, the equilibrium turnout rate increases. That is states
where leaders are more aggressive can present higher participation rates. The
following graph illustrates the proposition, it represents the variations of the
equilibrium attack and the participation when β increases:
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
To understand Proposition 5, notice that there are two competing eﬀects.
The ﬁrst eﬀect is a direct eﬀect on equilibrium attack and promotion levels.
When the sensitivity to attack increases, then the equilibrium attack level
increases and the equilibrium promotion decreases. This eﬀect makes par-
ticipation fall. A second eﬀect is the ”impact eﬀect”. When the sensitivity
to attack increases, the relative eﬀect of attack decreases and participation
16rises. The ﬁrst eﬀect is constant while the second eﬀect changes when the
sensitivity to attack increases. Since the marginal eﬀects of attack and pro-
motion on a candidate’s eﬀective eﬀort are decreasing (because β<1), the
”impact eﬀect” is high for heterogeneous values of attack and promotion and
is small for homogeneous values of attack and promotion levels. Then, when
comparing diﬀerent States elections or National elections, one compares het-
erogeneous populations in term of sensitivities to attack and promotion, and
then, one can observe a positive correlation between attack and participa-
tion (when the populations are almost equally sensitive to both tones) like
in Wattenberg and Brians (1999), or a negative correlation (when the popu-
lations are very sensitive to one of the tone) like in AISV (1994) , or one can
observe no correlation (when the range of sensitivities is large) like in Finkel
and Geer (1998).
5 Discussions
In this section, through two diﬀerent examples, we relax two assumptions
of the model. In a ﬁrst sub-section, we relax the equal budget hypothesis
and derive a relation between the budget and the level of aggressiveness of a
candidate. In the second sub-section, we compare the case of a proportional
election with N players to the case of majority election with two candidates.
5.1 Is an underdog candidate more aggressive?
In our context, we consider an underdog candidate who has less ﬁnancial
support than her adversary. Let R be the underdog candidate and L the
advantaged candidate, with BR <B L. Unfortunately, it seems diﬃcult to
obtain general results with this assumption. In diﬀerent models, Skaperdas
and Grofman (1995) and Harrigton and Hess (1996) show that the underdog
candidate, deﬁned as the candidate with the smaller initial popular support,
is more aggressive than his adversary. We provide an example in which the
underdog candidate is, in equilibrium, less aggressive than the advantaged
17candidate. Consider the main example with α = β. Candidate R’s optimiza-




























BR = dR + aR.
The equilibrium of this campaign game is unique and the candidates eﬀorts
in negative and positive advertisement are given in the following proposition:
Proposition 6 There exists a unique equilibrium. The underdog candidate
















































Contrary to the case where candidates have equal budgets, the equilib-
rium participation depends on the expected value of candidate R support
share, E (r). Since BL >B R, then the more candidate L expected support
(1 − E (r)) is large, the higher the participation rate. Indeed, the advan-
taged candidate can generate more participation (ψL∗ >ψ R∗), but he is
more aggressive than the underdog, in relative and absolute terms:


















This result directly follows from proposition 6. The underdog candidate
is less aggressive than the advantaged one and he is relatively less aggressive.
The intuition of this result is linked to the remark made in section 2. A strong
candidate has an incentive to be more aggressive, and a weak candidate has
an incentive to be more defensive. This result can be understood in the
light of the remark made in section 2, that is a candidate with a better
image increases his level of attack. When a candidate has a greater budget,
he can easily have a better image than her adversary, and then is more
aggressive. Indeed, when a candidate’s image is high, the marginal eﬀect of
promotion becomes small compared to the marginal eﬀect of aggressiveness.
Concerning contests in general, this result seems to be realistic, in a conﬂict,
the more aggressive being generally the strongest contestant. In the context
of elections, this is certainly not always the case, but we think that other
important eﬀects would have to be considered, as incumbency. Indeed, the
eﬀect of attacking a party which have never been in power is certainly smaller
than attacking a governing party with veriﬁable arguments.
5.2 Majority VS Proportionality
We now discuss the question addressed by Konrad [10]. The question is
whether or not an increase in the number of candidates leads to an increase
of aggressiveness. Konrad [10] shows that in a symmetric equilibrium, when
budgets are not ﬁxed, sabotage can be eliminated if the number of players
is large enough. Through an example, we conclude that, in equilibrium,
candidates attacks decrease with the number of candidates. We suppose that
19candidates maximize their share of votes. Consider N candidates competing




















where aij is the level of attack from i targeted on candidate j, di is the level of
defence of player i,( a)j =i =( a1,...,ai−1,a i+1,...,aN) is the vector of attacks
targeted on i. The cost function is linear and the budget ﬁxed to 1, so that





The main diﬀerence with the two candidates case is the eﬀect of a candidate’s
attack on the payoﬀ of the candidates that are not targeted. The derivative










Thus, an attack from i to j generates positive externalities on the other
candidates. Solving this example leads to the following result:
Proposition 8 In the proportional election with N candidates there is a






Finally, the more candidates in the competition, the less they are aggres-
sive. The intuition underlying this result stems from the positive externali-
ties of attacks on the other candidates. This externality leads candidates to
reduce their attack level, and this reduction is even greater the larger the
number of candidates.
206C o n c l u s i o n
We have presented a model of contest with two players choosing between
positive or negative campaigning and given suﬃcient conditions for the exis-
tence and the uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium. We have proposed an
application to negative political campaigns. Through an example, our results
suggest that the relation between attack and participation can be positive
or negative, depending on the distribution of the sensitivities to positive and
negative advertisements in the electorate. Furthermore, we have shown that
a candidate with a smaller ﬁnancial support may be less aggressive than his
adversary.
217 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: A symmetric equilibrium exists only if the fol-
lowing equation has a solution a∗ in [0,C−1(B)]
ϕ1 (δ (a),a)+ϕ2 (δ (a),a)=0 , (5)
Let f(a)=ϕ1 (δ (Γ(a)),a)+ϕ2 (δ (a),Γ(a)), its derivative is given by:
f
 (a)=[ ϕ22 (δ(a),a) − ϕ11 (δ(a),a)] + [ϕ12 (δ (a),a) − ϕ21 (δ (a),a)],
Since ϕ is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, the second term in brackets is
null, then f (a) > 0. Since lim
a→0+f(a)=−∞ and lim
a→C−1(B)−f(a)=+ ∞. Hence,
there exists at most one a∗ such that (a∗,a ∗) is a symmetric equilibrium. The






































Then there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 : The condition
∂2εd
∂a2 , ∂2εa
∂d2 > 0i se q u i v a l e n tt o
ϕ112,ϕ 221 > 0. We ﬁrst show that if aL  = aR,t h e nϕ112,ϕ 221 > 0o r
ϕ112,ϕ 221 < 0 ⇒ dΓR
daL (aL) dΓL
daR (aR) < 0. Indeed:
Suppose ϕ112,ϕ 221 > 0. Consider the case aL >a R,t h e nδ (aL) <δ (aR).
These two inequalities implies that ϕ12 (δ(aR),a L) >ϕ 12 (δ (aL),a R), hence,
dΓR
daL (aL) < 0a n ddΓL
daR (aR) > 0. Now consider aR >a L,w i t ht h es a m e
reasoning, we obtain: dΓR
daL (aL) > 0a n ddΓL
daR (aR) < 0.
Suppose ϕ112,ϕ 221 < 0. if aL >a R,t h e ndΓR
daL (aL) > 0a n ddΓL
daR (aR) < 0. If
aR >a L,t h e ndΓR
daL (aL) < 0a n ddΓL
daR (aR) > 0.
22Since in the unique symmetric equilibrium the two reaction functions deriva-
tives are null, ϕ112,ϕ 221 > 0 implies that if aL  = aR, then ΓR (aL)  =Γ L (aR).
Then there does not exist any asymmetric equilibrium.
Proof of Corollary 3: The example veriﬁes the assumptions of the previous
























 2 < 0.
and, second order derivatives,
ψ11 (d,a)=α(a)



















 4 < 0,















 2 > 0,










Hence, with simple computations, we obtain:
ϕ221 (d,a) ∝ αβ
 
(β − 1)d




ϕ112 (d,a) ∝ αβ
 
(α − 1)a
β − (α +1 )d
α 
< 0,
23This example also verify the Inada conditions: lim
d→0
ϕ1 (d,a)=+ ∞, and lim
a→0
ϕ2 (d,a)=−∞. Finally, with proposition 2, there exists a unique equilib-
rium.
Proof of Proposition 4: With proposition 2 and corollary 3, since H is a
strictly increasing function, the example admits a unique equilibrium and it




























Proof of Proposition 5:
Simple computations lead to: a  (β)P ∗  (β) ∝− 2 − ln(β (1 − β)), then











roots of e−2 + β2 − β = 0. Hence, the result holds.
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25Then, the ﬁrst order condition of candidate’s i maximization program is given









And the same is true for each candidate i. Then, a few computation leads
to, for all i:













































Then the second order conditions are veriﬁed.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium Participation and Attack when β increases
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